• Mirësevini tek Forumi Virtual

    Nëse ju shfaqet ky mesazh do të thotë se ju nuk jeni regjistruar akoma. Edhe pse nuk jeni regjistruar ju arrini të shihni pjesën me të madhe të seksioneve dhe diksutimeve të forumit, por akoma nuk gëzoni të drejten për të marrë pjesë në to dhe në avantazhet e të qënurit anëtar i këtij komuniteti.

    Regjistrimi është plotësisht falas në komunitetin tonë, pasi të regjistrohesh do të gëzosh shumë të drejta si të japesh mendimin tënd në një diskutim, të hapësh një diksutim tëndin, të komunikosh me anëtarët e tjerë të komunitetit në mënyrë private, të marësh pjesë dhe të votosh në konkursin e poezisë dhe të fotografisë dhe shumë opsione të tjera... duke përdorur mënyrën më të thjeshtë dhe të sigurtë për tu rregjistruar
    GOOGLE Microsoft Yahoo

    Për cdo problem mos hezitoni të na " KONTAKTONI ".

Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

Зngjεll

___________
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

me sa di une kombesia nuk ndryshohet asnjehere dhe ska ligj ne bote qe e ndryshon.
nenshtetesia po, ndryshohet.
Dhe une keshtu i di gjerat per kete ceshtje . Kur merr nje nenshtetesi nuk ka as betim as asgje mbi flamur , vete ne prefekture kur te therrasin qe eshte gati dhe kaq asgje tjeter .
Nuk e kuptoj pse eshte bere nje ceshtje kaq tragjike perderisa asnje shtet ne bote nuk te mohon te drejtat e origjines tende dhe asnje shtet nuk te forcon te hedhesh poshte origjinen tende .
Gjithe keto deklarata neper gazeta apo tv jane vetem nje sulm si gjithmone i greqise ndaj Shqiperise . Nuk besoj se greqia ka te drejten te ndryshoje kombesine e nje shqipetari .
Vetem ata qe jane me karte homogjeniteti ( personat me kombesi greke por me shtetesi shqiptare) qe ndodhen ne Greqi do te marrin shtetesi greke por do tu lejohet dhe shtetesia shqiptare , me pak sa di une .
Persa i perket pjeses tjeter te emigranteve shqiptare ne Greqi. Nese u jepet nenshtetesia greke a do tju lejohet dhe ajo shqiptare? ( kjo eshte nje pyetje e cila do pergjigje )
Sipas meje nese dikush eshte shqiptar por me pashaporte te huaj atehere ai ngelet shqiptar ne ndergjegje dhe kombesia ngelet gjithmone shqipetare .

Te gjitha keto jane marifete te politikes dhe qe nuk merren vesh asnjehere .
 

orakulli

Anëtar i Respektuar
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

Models of Citizenship and the Content of Claim-Making
Institutions are “basic rules of the game or principles of order that characterize a particular society at a particular point in time” (Clemens 1998: 110). Such principles can be anchored in a society’s political life and crystallize in concrete power relations and forms of government.
Political opportunity structures represent nothing else than the translation on the terrain of social movement theory of this aspect of institutions. But, as recent trends in institutionalist
7
theory in history, sociology, and political science have pointed out (e.g. Powell and DiMaggio
1991; Scott 1995; Steinmo et al. 1992), institutions also have a cultural side. In this sense,
“durable or regular patterns of social life reflect deeply embedded, at times sacralized, cultural
components” (Clemens 1998: 117). Institutions draw their effectiveness not only from the internalization of norms and practices or from the power of social sanctioning, but also from the collective definitions and public discourses that make them become part of a shared identity.
Although the two are related in many ways, here we analytically distinguish between
the political side of institutions and their cultural side. We have previously operationalized the former aspect for our present purpose through the concept of political opportunity structures.
In this section we discuss the latter aspect. To operationalize the cultural-institutional setting
we suggest to look at models of citizenship. We maintain that the ways in which migrant
populations are incorporated into the host society vary widely among countries and that this has important implications for the content of claim-making by immigrants and ethnic
minorities.
Recent comparative work on national regimes for the incorporation of migrants have
stressed the importance of citizenship rights (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Favell 1998;
Koopmans and Kriesi 1997; Koopmans and Statham 1998; Smith and Blanc 1996; Soysal
1994). Brubaker’s (1992) work is particularly relevant in this context. It points to the cultural foundations of national states and to how present-day formal definitions of citizenship reflect deeply rooted understandings of nationhood. In his comparison of France and Germany, the author shows that the German jus sanguinis legal tradition is based on a conception of the national community in ethnocultural terms, while the French tradition, which emphasizes the jus solis rule, stems from a republican, contractualistic, and political definition of the state. He explains this difference with the divergent history of state formation in the two countries: “n France, then, a bureaucratic monarchy engendered a political and territorial conception of
nationhood; while in Germany, the disparity in scale between supranational Empire and the subnational profusion of sovereign and semisovereign political units fostered the development of an ethnocultural understanding of nationhood” (Brubaker 1992: 4). In brief, German citizenship is ethnic-based and reflects the idea of the nation-state, while French citizenship is civic-based and reflects the idea of the nation-state. Both component are constitutive of the national state, although in diverse mixtures.
8 Models of citizenship and regimes for the incorporation of migrants stem largely from
these conceptions of nationhood, but not only. The cultural obligations posed on immigrants to be accepted in the national community play a role as well (Koopmans and Statham 1998). Just as states have formal criteria for access to citizenship that can vary from one country to the other, they also place different cultural obligations on defining the access to citizenship. Again,we can distinguish between two ideal-types: those states that follow an assimilationist approach and those that privilege a pluralistic view. The former is more demanding as
immigrants are asked to conform to the cultural norms and values of the host society. The latter is less restrictive as it provides for the recognition of ethnic difference and, sometimes,even promotes it.
We can conceptualize the cultural-political setting for the claim-making of immigrants and ethnic minorities as resulting from different combinations of formal criteria of citizenship and cultural obligations for having access to it (Koopmans and Statham 1998). Figure 2 shows the resulting typology. Combining these two dimensions yields three main models of incorporation of migrants. The combination of an ethnic definition of nationhood and citizenship with an assimilationist view of cultural obligations gives us a situation in which it is very difficult for foreigners to become members of the national community. This situation corresponds to the differentialist model of incorporation, or rather of non-incorporation, of migrants. Here minorities face at the same time an exclusionary national community and a demanding environment in terms of the extent to which they have to adapt to the rules and cultural codes of the host country, thus putting aside their ethnic difference. Germany is perhaps the best empirical approximation of this model. Among new countries of immigration,
Italy is another example. Switzerland also tends towards this model, although it is probably less restrictive than Germany as to the assimilationist requirements for obtaining citizenship rights.33 It is in fact not easy to situate the Swiss case in the assimilationist-pluralist continuum. Switzerland is characterized by a high level of cultural heterogeneity and does not have a dominant national culture.
Furthermore, it has a long tradition of pluralism with regard to both linguistic and religious minorities. For these two reasons, we would be tempted to place Switzerland on the pluralist pole of the continuum. On the other hand, however, immigrants are asked to adapt to the new cultural context. Of course, they cannot do so with respect to a national cultural model, as it simply does not exist. But the acquisition of Swiss citizenship is locally based and prospective citizens must assimilate to the local habits and values, that is, to the local culture.
Thus, while Switzerland is certainly pluralist towards the cultures traditionally recognized within the context of federalism and of the existing informal procedures for the integration of the minorities that have contributed to 9
At the other extreme, we have a situation in which a civic conception of citizenship combines with a pluralistic view of cultural obligations. This is the multicultural model of incorporation, which is exemplified by Britain and the Netherlands, although some might prefer to avoid calling the former multicultural on the ground that its multiculturalism is limited to racial groups. In this context foreigners born in the host country are in principle granted citizenship regardless of their ethnic origin, and minorities are recognized their right to ethnic difference.
A sort of intermediate but important case is that which combines a civic conception of
citizenship and an assimilationist view of cultural obligations. This is most typically the case of France, which is usually called the assimilationist model of incorporation. It is relatively easy to obtain the French citizenship, but the price to pay for that is the abandoning of ethnic-based identities in favor of accepting the republican ideal of the state.
Finally, the fourth possible type– coupling an ethnic conception of citizenship with a pluralistic view of cultural obligations –does not seem to be empirically plausible as a definition of the national community in ethnic terms seems to exclude the possibility of few cultural requirements for belonging to that community.
Figure 2
Like political opportunities, models of citizenship affect the claim-making by immigrants and ethnic minorities. As we suggested, in this case their impact is less on the forms of action than on the content of claim-making. In other words, different national models of incorporation translate into different distributions of claims made by ethnic minorities. On the more general level, we expect the focus of claims to differ in France and Switzerland.
France’s civic-based model should facilitate the presence of migrants in the national public debates and encourage them to focus on their situation in the host society, while the Swiss ethnic-based model should produce a stronger emphasis on homeland issues, that is, issues pertaining to their country of origin. For the symbolic definition of citizenship – and more generally of the patterns of inclusion in and exclusion from the national community – influences the degree to which they feel as belonging to that community and legitimized to intervene in the national public space. The dominant labels of “immigrants” (immigrés) in France and of “foreigners” (Auslنnder) in Switzerland are the discursive reflect of such varying sense of
belonging and legitimacy. Regarding the content of claim-making, we thus expect that, in a the formation of the state, it is much less pluralist towards ethnic minorities of migrant origins, especially those
who arrived most recently.
10
country where a differentialist model of incorporation prevails, migrants address claims primarily to their homeland, whereas the assimilationist model (like the multicultural model) provides them with the opportunities to raise issues pertaining to their situation in the host
society.
Further, the assimilationist model creates a tension between the strong cultural obligations required for the incorporation into the host country and the readiness or willingness of ethnic minorities to be assimilated. As a consequence, we should observe a high proportion of claims aimed at asking for the recognition of difference on the part of minority groups
whose collective identity is endangered by the cultural requirements for assimilation. Thus, our second hypothesis concerning the content of claim-making stems from the assumption that France’s cultural-institutional setting leads ethnic minorities to put much emphasis on their collective identity as a basis for claim-making in the host country. The assimilationist model of incorporation of migrants adopted in France largely denies the recognition of ethnic difference in favor of a civic allegiance to the French habits and values (e.g. Birnbaum 1998; Brubaker 1992; Leca 1992; Schnapper 1991). We therefore expect ethnic minorities to react to such demanding cultural requirements and mobilize primarily on issues pertaining to cultural diversity and for the recognition of ethnic difference.
Data and Methods
In line with our theoretical aim to combine political and cultural variables in the study of contentious politics in general and of the claim-making by immigrants and ethnic minorities in
particular, the method we adopt is an attempt to integrate two approaches that have traditionally been associated with one or the other of these two research strands: protest event analysis and public discourse analysis. The former has been used by political opportunity
theorists to gather systematic evidence on the levels and forms of social movement mobilization. The latter has often been adopted by cultural analysts to support theoretical ideas with empirical material. Public claims analysis hopefully takes the strengths of both
approaches, while avoiding their weaknesses, as it combines the systematic observation of events with a richer attention to detailes concerning the content of claims (Koopmans and
Statham 1999a).
The data with which we confront our theoretical arguments come from an ongoing comparative research project on the mobilization on ethnic relations, citizenship and 11 immigration (MERCI).4 Using one national newspaper in each country (Le Monde in France and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung in Switzerland) which provides a good source for the coverage
of news of national scope and significance – that is, those we are particularly interested in –,four broad types of public claims were coded: (1) protest actions and collective mobilizations (street demonstrations, petitions, confrontational and violent actions, etc.), (2) speech acts(public statements, written reports, media-addressed events in general, etc.), (3) political decisions (laws, administrative acts, judicial decisions, etc.), (4) repressive measures by the
state against extreme-right and ethnic-minority actors.5 All reported claims were coded which refer to immigration, asylum, and aliens politics, minority politics (including citizenship), and
antiracism. This defines the field of ethnic relations, citizenship, and immigration (henceforth ERCI fields). In addition, we coded all claims by ethnic minorities, regardless of whether they pertained to this field. Homeland politics is included in this subsample. Finally, we coded all
claims by extreme-right actors. Claims were sampled by coding every second issue of the newspaper source. The data gathered in the research project cover the period from 1990 to 1998 included, but in this paper we limit our analyses to the 1990-1994 period.
Findings
Legitimacy and Access to the National Public Space In the remainder of the paper, we try to explain by means of empirical evidence cross-national variations (1) in the presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the national public space,(2) in the modalities of their collective claim-making, and (3) in the content of claim-making.
We confront our hypotheses on the impact of political opportunity structures and models of citizenship with our sample of public claims in France and Switzerland.
To begin with, we argue that the presence of ethnic minorities in the public space is largely constrained by the larger cultural-institutional context, specifically by the national models of citizenship and of incorporation of migrants. As Brubaker (1992) has pointed out,
models of citizenship contribute to defining the symbolic relationship between migrants and the national state, and therefore affect the collective definition of migrant populations. In other words, they influence the shared understanding that nationals have of migrants. Switzerland’s differentialist model implies a sharp distinction between citizens and non-citizens, a distinction4 The MERCI project includes the following country studies, in addition to France and Switzerland: Germany (Ruud Koopmans), Britain (Paul Statham), and the Netherlands (Thom Duyvené de Wit).
12
that implies an exclusionary labeling of migrants as “foreigners.” In contrast, France’s assimilationist and hence more inclusive model of citizenship yields a definition of migrants in less exclusionary terms, attaching to them the label of “immigrants.” The multicultural model
has yet another definition of migrants as “ethnic minorities,” thus stressing the recognition of ethnic difference.
This collective attribution of identity influences both the distribution of cultural resources and the space for the political participation of migrants in the host society. As Koopmans and Statham (1998: 17) have recently stated, “t makes a difference whether one
is ‘foreigner’, ‘immigrant’ or ‘ethnic minority’; these are not just symbols but forms of social relationships which legitimate and facilitate certain types of participation in society, whilst delegitimating and negatively conditioning others.” Accordingly, we argue that models of
citizenship define to a large extent the legitimacy of minority groups to participate in public debates and determine the access for their intervention in the national public space. As we said,
migrants are usually labeled in Switzerland as “foreigners,” that is, individuals who symbolically do not belong to the national community and who have little legitimacy to publicly address their collective claims. As a result, they face an unfavorable cultural-institutional
setting to intervene in the national public space. In a way, migrants in Switzerland are denied the status of political actors.
The situation is quite different in France, where they are usually labeled as “immigrants” rather than “foreigners.” In other words, they are considered as belonging to the national community, although not necessarily fully so. Tallien’s public declaration in the
aftermath of the French revolution is symptomatic of this state of affairs: “Il n’y a d’étranger en France que les mauvais citoyens”6 (quoted in Azimi 1988: 702). It is in this period that
France built the republican ideal of an inclusive immigration country (Leca 1992). Migrants in France are not considered as guestworkers, as still occurs in Switzerland and Germany for example, but rather as people living permanently or at least for a long period in the country and
who are entitled to participate in the public debates on an equal basis as nationals. Such inclusiveness, however, has a price, namely that immigrants conform to the republican values of liberté, égalité, fraternité and to the principles of laïcité. They are asked not to distinguish themselves from nationals in the name of these values and principles. The important point for 5 Repressive measures are excluded from the sample used in this paper. 6 “There is no foreigner in France but the bad citizens.”
13
our present purpose is that the French assimilationist model therefore legitimizes newcomers to intervene in the national public space not in their quality of minority groups, but rather as individuals who belong to the national community as any other citizen. They have little
legitimacy and few opportunities to participate in the national public debate as ethnic minorities, that is, by putting forth their ethnicity. Instead, they are free to participate as workers, parents, residents of suburbs, and other categories based on economic or social
characteristics rather than cultural and ethnic ones. While the assimilationist model provides larger opportunities than the differentialist model, it therefore limits the access for the intervention of migrants in the public space on behalf of their collective interests as minorities.
7
The findings largely support our argument about the impact of the cultural-institutional setting on the presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the national public space. As Table 1 shows, the participation of migrants in the national public debates in Switzerland is
very limited. Of all the speech acts and collective mobilizations we gathered for the first five years of the nineties, only 4.5 % have been made by minority groups. In contrast, the latter are
more widely present in French public debates as 13.3 % of claims have been made by immigrés. However, the presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the public space is rather limited in both countries. If we confront these results with comparable evidence from
Britain, where about one fifth of the claims come from minorities (Koopmans and Statham1998: 38), we see that France is an intermediary case between Switzerland and Britain.
According to our argument, this is largely due to variations in the prevailing regimes of incorporation: Switzerland’s differentialist model gives migrants little legitimacy as well as few resources and opportunities to intervene in the national public space; Britain’s multicultural model encourages them to participate more frequently in the national debates, and moreover they do so largely on the basis of their ethnic identity; France’s assimilationist model, which
implies no clear-cut distinction between citizens and immigrants, scores better than the Swiss
case, but does not facilitate the claim-making by migrants to the same extent than Britain.
Table 1
In spite of nearly 20 % of its population being made of foreigners, Switzerland does not legitimate them as political actors and does not offer them viable opportunities for claimmaking.
To be sure, foreigners in Switzerland do mobilize, yet not to address their grievances 7 This effect should contrast with the emphasis given to ethnic difference in the multicultural model, which is expected to offer migrants a favorable cultural-institutional setting for participating in the national public 14
to the host country but rather to their homeland. Turks, Kurds, former Yugoslavians,Albanians, Tibetans are among the most active minorities in Switzerland. As can be seen in the right-hand column of Table 1, if we consider also claims outside the ERCI field migrants are
responsible for 15.8 % of the claims. However, as Table 2 makes clear, 67.2 % of their claims refer to the issue field of homeland politics and are thus not related to the national political agenda. Not being integrated in the host society, migrants who reside in Switzerland keep strong ties with their country of origin. The fact that they have long been considered and are in part still considered as temporary guestworkers who will one day return to their country and
therefore do not need to be integrated, as the lack of a coherent integration policy attests,encourages them to maintain the links with their homeland and to be active with respect to it rather than to the host society. In contrast, although a large part of France’s migrant
populations come from countries with dramatic internal conflicts such
as Algeria, Iran, and former Yugoslavia, which would more than justify their involvement in their homeland’s affairs, only a small part of the claims made by ethnic minorities refer to their country of origin.
The way in which they are incorporated into the French national community leads them to be politically active in France and to participate in the French political life rather than to keep strong ties with their homeland.

Table 2
The Forms and Content of Claim-Making
Let us now focus on the forms and content of claim-making by immigrants an ethnic minorities within the ERCI field. The political-institutional context allows us to explain variations in the
forms of claim-making. Following “classical” political opportunity theories, we have hypothesized that the forms of action depend on certain characteristics of the state and on the behavior of authorities vis-à-vis social movements. Specifically, we expect collective
mobilizations by migrants to be more radical in France, where political institutions and prevailing strategies yield closed political opportunity structures as compared to Switzerland, where the particular combination of these two dimensions offers a more favorable context. The findings presented in Table 3 confirm this hypothesis.8 In France, more than half of the
collective mobilizations are either confrontational (44.6 %) or violent (11.9 %). If they want to
debates in their quality of minorities.
8 This table includes collective mobilizations only (i.e. non-verbal actions), thus excluding speech acts.
15
be heard in closed opportunity structures, minority groups must act, as any other protest
group, with some degree of radicalness. In Switzerland, in the rare instances in which migrants
address the host country, they do so in a more moderate fashion, mostly by means of
demonstrative and peaceful actions. Unlike in France, social movements in Switzerland do not
need to make use of radical forms of action to get their claims on the political and public
agendas. Of course, this is not equivalent to say that protest in Switzerland is more successful
than in France. The opportunity to engage in encounters does not necessarily translate into a
positive outcome of the encounters.
Table 3
Political opportunity theorists have no doubt contributed to our knowledge of the
forms of claim-making and their variation according to the institutional context, but have little
to say about its content. Following the way paved by scholars who have stressed the role of
cultural variables in contentious politics, we maintain that models of citizenship provide the
cultural-institutional setting that shapes the content of claim-making by immigrants and ethnic
minorities. We argue that the claim-making by minorities varies cross-nationally according to
the collective definition of migrants, which in turn stems from the dominant model of
citizenship and defines their status in the host society. As we said, France’s assimilationist
model defines outsiders as “immigrants” who must integrate into the national community. This
leads us to make three predictions regarding the content of claim-making in such a context.
First, migrants tend to loosen the ties with their homeland in favor of a privileged relationship
with the host society and to make claims related to their situation in the latter. Second, they are
to some extent accepted as part of the national community and often have citizen status.
Therefore they can focus on issues pertaining to their quality of members of the French
community, and specifically on the recognition of their rights vis-à-vis the national majority.
We thus expect claims by immigrants and ethnic minorities to deal primarily with their situation
into the host society rather than with the entry in and exit from the country.
Third, on the basis of the principle of equality among human beings brought to the fore
by the French revolution, France avoids making a distinction between nationals and immigrants
with regard to social rights and welfare provisions. The application of the principle of equality
to migration policies impacts on the claim-making by immigrants and ethnic minorities. The
latter should not be so much concerned with their social rights, for they have already obtained
these rights or, at a minimum, French authorities pay much attention to this issue. Furthermore,
the principle of universal rights, another fundamental tenet of the French revolution, implies the
16
refusal of any particularism and the denial of claims for the recognition of ethnic difference and
cultural diversity. This principle has contributed to bring about the assimilationist model of
citizenship. However, it sometimes might be impossible to adapt to the French dominant
culture, especially for migrants who come from a very different type of society. As Kymlicka
(1995) has pointed out, cultural rights are inherent in individual personality, and it is often
psychologically difficult and socially quite destructive to have to downplay ethnic difference.
Migrants in France face a situation in which they are asked to avoid expressing cultural
diversity in the name of the respect of French republicanism, and we may think that they try to
redress this situation by asking the authorities and more generally the French society to remove
such constraints from their everyday life. We thus expect claims for cultural rights and the
recognition of difference to be quite frequent in France as compared to Switzerland.
In effect, the situation as regards the content of claim-making is very different in
Switzerland. The differentialist model conveys an exclusionary definition of citizenship which
implies a sharp distinction between citizens and aliens and which excludes migrants from the
national community. This has two important consequences for the content of claim-making by
immigrants and ethnic minorities in such cultural-institutional setting. On the one hand, since
they are defined as “foreigners,” migrants tend to be denied certain rights to which citizens are
entitled. Most important, migrants themselves share this perception of their status in the host
society and feel that they are not fully legitimized to address their demands to the host country.
When they do so, they ask for social rights, that is, rights that facilitate their living conditions
in the host society in areas such as education, health care, social security, and so forth. On the
other hand, unlike the civic conception of citizenship, which makes the assertion of cultural
diversity easier, the ethnic conception underlying the differentialist model of incorporation
tends to discourage this kind of claims. Specifically, we expect migrants to stress three types of
claims in a differentialist context such as Switzerland’s. First, since their exclusion from the
national community tends to encourage them to keep strong ties with their country of origin,
homeland politics is the focus of claim-making. Second, when they act within the national
public space, claim-making by ethnic minorities refers for the most part to the fragility of their
presence in the host country. In other words, claims aim to raise the problem of their unstable
position and the potential or actual threat of being expulsed. Third, in spite of their precarious
status and the lack of an effective integration policy, migrants who reside in Switzerland
permanently (or virtually so) ask for increased social equality with nationals. Thus, we expect
them to raise demands for social rights which may improve their living conditions. In contrast,
17
we should observe a low proportion of claims for cultural rights, that is, claims for the right to
ethnic difference and cultural diversity.
These hypotheses are supported by our data. To begin with, as can be seen in Table 2,
only a small part of the claims in France (12.4 %) are in the field of homeland politics. Second,
claims related to French debates and policies deal mostly with minority politics, Furthermore,
as Table 4 shows, a large part of them focus on cultural rights (26.7 %), whereas little is done
concerning social rights. These patterns are substantially different in Switzerland. Migrants in
Switzerland enter the public space most of the time with claims related to their homeland,
either addressing the authorities in the country of origin or the Swiss authorities with regard to
homeland issues. When migrants engage in claim-making on issues pertaining to their situation
in the host country, which occurs only one out of three times, the thematic focus of claims is
on immigration, asylum, and aliens politics, that is, on migration flows, (Table 2). Migrants are
mostly concerned with the fragility of their status as “foreigners,” specifically with the potential
threat of expulsion or deportation. They are much less concerned with their situation in the
Swiss society as only 23.2 % of the claims address minority politics, against 51.2 % referring
to migration flows (Table 4). Furthermore, when they address the host country’s authorities on
minority issues, they ask for social rather than cultural rights.
In sum, public claims analysis seems to confirm that the cultural-institutional setting, as
reflected in the dominant models of citizenship and regimes for the incorporation of migrants,
shapes the content of claim-making by immigrants and ethnic minorities in France and
Switzerland.
Table 4
Discussion and Conclusion
Recent work has stressed the importance of dominant definitions of citizenship and regimes for
the incorporation of migrants to explain cross-national variations in the nature and type of
relations between national majorities and ethnic minorities of migrant origin (e.g. Birnbaum
1998; Brubaker 1992; Kastoryano 1996; Leca 1992; Schnapper 1991). Many of these studies
address theoretical issues. Others try to establish a link between such long-standing cultural
traditions and the formulation and outcomes of migration policies, in particular policies
regarding the access to citizenship (e.g. Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1992; Joppke 1999; Safran
1997). Yet little has been done so far on the dynamics of collective mobilization and claimmaking
around issues pertaining to immigration and ethnic relations (e.g. Blatt 1995; Fibbi and
18
Bolzmann 1991; Ireland 1994; Koopmans and Statham 1998; Soysal 1997). Our contribution
inquires into the impact of models of citizenship on processes of collective mobilization and
claim-making by immigrants and ethnic minorities. We have proposed to conceptualize regimes
of incorporation as the cultural-institutional setting which determines the possibilities for the
intervention of migrants in the national public space and affects the content of claim-making.
Migrants’ claims vary according to the degree of inclusiveness of the host country’s national
community and to the cultural obligations posed upon them as a condition to become part of
that community. Models of citizenship affect, on the one hand, the legitimacy these groups
have to participating in national public debates and hence their presence in the national public
space. On the other hand, models of citizenship define the legitimacy of migrants to intervene
on the basis of their ethnic identity and thus shape the content of their claims.
Our empirical evidence on claim-making by immigrants and ethnic minorities in France
and Switzerland largely support our theoretical arguments. First, migrants have mobilized
around issues pertaining to their situation in the host country more often in assimilationist
France than in differentialist Switzerland, where they have focused primarily on homeland
issues. However, the more frequent presence in France is conditioned by the strong cultural
obligations posed on migrants, which discourage them to engage in claim-making on the basis
of their ethnic difference. Second, we have observed important variations in the general focus
of claims. On a general level, minority politics is a much more important issue field in France
than in Switzerland, where migrants address most of the time issues pertaining to immigration,
asylum, and aliens politics. On a more specific level, immigrants and ethnic minorities focus on
cultural rights in France, whereas in Switzerland the thematic focus is on the fragility and
instability of their situation in the host country, particularly on the issue of expulsions. Finally,
we were able to show that closed political opportunity structures in France force migrants to
adopt radical forms of action if they are to be heard by the authorities, while a more favorable
political-institutional setting in Switzerland facilitates the use of moderate forms of action in
the rather rare instances in which migrants have access to the national public space.
On a more general level, our paper brings evidence about the claim-making by
immigrants and ethnic minorities to bear upon an important theoretical discussion in the
literature on contentious politics. Following recent calls for a more careful attention to cultural
variables in the study of social movements (Gamson 1992; Johnston and Klandermans 1995;
McClurg Mueller and Morris 1992; Melucci 1996; Snow et al. 1986), we stressed the impact
of the cultural-institutional context on migrants’ public claims in France and Switzerland.
19
Much if not most work on social movements during the last two decades has focused upon
political and institutional opportunities as key variables for explaining their mobilization. This
has strengthened our knowledge of the conditions under which social protest arise and remain
sustained over time. Yet political opportunity theorists, safe a few still too rare exceptions (e.g.
Diani 1996; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Koopmans and Statham 1999b), have largely
overlooked the impact of cultural variables. We think that this is one of the reasons why the
political process approach to social movements has been strong in explaining the rise and fall
of protest, its extent, and variations in the forms of actions, but has remained rather silent
about its content. The difficulty to explain the content of claim-making clearly limits the
explanatory power of this approach. As we have tried to show, once we bring cultural factors
back in our explanations, we are in a better position to account for variations across countries
as well as over time in what is claimed through protest activities.
There is more than that, though. We think that cultural variables can as well help
explain the emergence and extent of protest insofar as the cultural-institutional context sets the
preconditions for challengers to enter the public space. Our study indicates that the prevailing
models of citizenship determine the legitimacy of migrants for participating in the national
public debates. This, together with the effect on the content of claims, leads to the conclusion
that we should pay much more attention to cultural variables in the study of social movements
and, more generally, contentious politics. However, we should not throw the baby with the
water. Political institutions do matter. In a way, ours is an attempt to combine cultural and
political explanations of claim-making. Models of citizenship allow us to understand the
presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the national public space and the content of
their claim-making, but political opportunities remain crucial to account for variations in the
forms of their actions. Yet cultural-institutional settings determine the extent to which political
institutions provide real opportunities for their mobilization. The Swiss political system offers
social movements a favorable setting for mobilizing insofar as it provides multiple points of
access to the political arenas due to the combination of open institutional structures and
inclusive prevailing strategies of the authorities (Kriesi et al. 1995). However, ethnic minorities
cannot fully take advantage of such opportunities as they are not legitimate actors in the
political process and, as a result, also lack strong political alliances which are crucial to benefit
from institutional opportunities (Kriesi et al. 1995). For example, in Switzerland leftist parties,
who are potential allies of minorities, are not connected to these groups or have at best only
sporadic and weak contacts with migrant organizations. Although in a different way, the
20
difficulty for immigrants to intervene in the national public space in France with an emphasis on
their ethnic identity also reduces the political opportunities for claim-making, which are already
relatively poor. The difficulty encountered by migrant organizations to enter the political
arenas and especially to remain active in them is a good illustration of such poor opportunities
(Blatt 1995; Ireland 1994; Withol de Wenden 1988).
To conclude, we want to reiterate the importance of combining political and cultural
aspects of the institutional context to reach a better explanation of processes of collective
mobilizations and claim-making. We need to bring culture back more firmly in the study of
contentious politics, but without for that matter neglecting the important role played by
political institutions, which was one of the major advances of social movement theory in the
last couple of decades. Here we have proposed one way to do so in the case of immigrants and
ethnic minorities. There are others, of course. We are only at the dawn of such an endeavor,
and we need to integrate more thoroughly and more systematically the advances made in two
research areas – contentious politics and migration studies – that much too often tend to ignore
each other instead of interacting in a fruitful way.
 

orakulli

Anëtar i Respektuar
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

This is most typically the case of France, which is usually called the assimilationist model of incorporation. It is relatively easy to obtain the French citizenship, but the price to pay for that is the abandoning of ethnic-based identities in favor of accepting the republican ideal of the state.
 

BeniT

Donatorë
Vendndodhja
Ne Krahet e Shqipes
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

Une nuk e di nqs sesa i vertete eshte lajmi , dhe me sa di une ne asnje shtet te botes nuk lejohet nderrimi i kombesise .
Tani per sa i perket qe nje emigrant te marrin nje pashaporte te huaj , nuk do te thote qe eshte tradhetar..
Marrja e neshtetesise te lehteson disa gjera , sidomos ne levizjen para dhe mbrapa , me pashaporte kanadeze lejohet te shkosh ne cdo vend pa vize , dmthn flas per shtetet komuniste , sepse me sa di une ne disa ne Kore , Kine dhe Kuba , dhe disa shteteve u kerkohet vize per te hyre atje . pastaj kur nenshtetesine nuk ke neevoje te te rinovoash cdo 5 vjet dokumentin e qendrimit . dhe plus qe me kete dokumentin qe kemi ketu ne unionin europian duhet vize , po ashtu edhe ne Usa . pastaj ke te drejte te votosh . pastaj kush ka mundesite , pasionin dhe njohurite , mund te kandidoje per deputet apo tjeter ..

Dhe per sa i perket nenshtesise ketu , ehste ndryshe nga europa ,
Une per vete kam aplikuar para nje viti dhe pas 10 ditesh kam testin per njohurite mbi gjeografine , historine, politiken , etj etj te kanadase , jane rreth nje 20 pytjesh qe duhet tu pergjigjesh 12 pyetjeve saktesisht , qe me shume rendesi juria apo gjykatsi i jep pergjigjeve , ndaj te drejtave te njeriut , ato pyetje duhen te sakta .
Pastaj pas testit rreth 4-6 jave te dergojne nje leter nqs e ke kaluar testin te caktojne diten e betimit dhe ceremonise per nenshtetesine kanadeze .. ..
 

orakulli

Anëtar i Respektuar
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

La Convenzione quadro oggetto della presente dissertazione, invece, pur rilevando che (art. 4): "le parti s'impegnano a garantire ad ogni persona appartenente ad una minoranza nazionale il diritto all'eguaglianza di fronte alla legge e ad una eguale protezione della legge", riconosce agli appartenenti alle minoranze nazionali alcune prerogative specifiche (di seguito meglio esplicitate) connaturate alla propria specificità.

La Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo, e specificamente il suo art. 14, non riconosce, invece, che la prima delle su menzionate categorie, precisando che: "il godimento dei diritti e delle libertà riconosciuti nella presente Convenzione deve essere assicurato senza nessuna discriminazione, in particolare quelle fondate sul sesso, la razza, il colore, la lingua, la religione, le opinioni politiche o di altro genere, l'origine nazionale o sociale, l'appartenenza ad una minoranza nazionale, la ricchezza, la nascita o ogni altra condizione".
 

orakulli

Anëtar i Respektuar
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.


Passaporto

Un passaporto è un documento di riconoscimento formale o una certificazione emessa da un governo nazionale che identifica il portatore come un cittadino di quel particolare stato e richiede il permesso, nel nome della sovranità o governo della nazione emittente, di entrare e passare per altre nazioni. I passaporti sono connessi al diritto di protezione legale all'estero ed al diritto di rientrare nella nazione della propria nazionalità. I passaporti di solito contengono la fotografia del portatore, i suoi dati anagrafici, la sua firma, la nazionalità ed alle volte altri mezzi di identificazione individuale. Molte nazioni stanno sviluppando proprietà biometriche per i loro passaporti per poter confermare con maggior certezza che la persona che presenta il passaporto ne sia il legittimo proprietario.

Un passaporto è di solito necessario per il viaggiare all'estero, dato che normalmente deve essere mostrato al confine, sebbene esistono accordi particolari tra nazioni per cui i cittadini possano utilizzare anche altri documenti di identità. Puٍ essere stampato o timbrato con visti emessi dalla nazione ospite che autorizzano l'ingresso.

Alcuni governi cercano di controllare il movimento dei loro cittadini emettendo cosى passaporti detti passaporti interni; per esempio nell'Unione Sovietica venivano emessi propiska a tutti i cittadini per controllare il loro movimento nel paese. Questo sistema è stato parzialmente mantenuto nella Russia.

Come documento di identificazione i passaporti sono frequentemente soggetti a furto e falsificazione.
 

orakulli

Anëtar i Respektuar
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

Salutando come di consueto da Tirana vorrei informare sulle altre reazioni suscitate dopo la proclamazione dell’Indipendenza del Kosovo, certo dai territori che copro io per questo programa. Prima d’iniziare vorrei affermare che bisogna essere razionali nel portare le notizie e gli analisi relativi, poiche altrimenti rischiamo di essere parte di una certa coalizione slavo- ortodossa che sta facendo di tutto per giustificare le “Profezie Moscovite” dopo la proclamazione dell’Indipendenza del Kosovo.

Se tu sei d'accordo tornerei alla manifestazione di Belgrado del 21 febbraio e alla violenze contro alcune ambasciate, in particolare contro l'ambasciata degli Usa. Secondo i servizi di intelligence americani l'attacco contro l'ambasciata sarebbe stato permesso dalle autorità serbe...

Sى, secondo quanto ripostato dall'edizione in lingua albanese della Voice of America il piu alto ufficile dei servizi di intelligence americani, Michael McConnell, ha dichiarato al Senato americano che secondo loro informazioni il governo serbo ha ordinato alla polizia di non intervenire mentre i gruppi estremisti attacavano le amabasciate occidentali a Belgrado. “Noi abbiamo abbastanza informazioni secondo le quali quando l’ambasciata statunitense, quella britannica e le altre sono state attacate, il governo serbo ha deciso di ritirare la polizia per permettere l’attacco e gli atti violenti”, ha affermato McConnell davanti alla Commissione Difesa del Senato USA. McConnell ha detto inoltre che secondo le informazioni in possesso del suo ufficio si pensa che la situazione nei Balcani potrebbe peggiorare iniziando dalla Bosnia Erzegovina in cui le relazioni interetniche sono molti fragili. Sempre secondo la Voice of America McConnell ha detto che tutto dipende dalla volonta di Belgrado di fermare la violenza o no, altrimenti dice McConnell la violenza potrebbe coinvolgere tutti i Balcani. Per McConnell solo le truppe NATO potrebbero fermare una precipitazione della situazione nei Balcani che iniziasse dalla Bosnia. Il Direttore McConnel, dice la Voice Of America ha anche avvisato il Senato che la precipitazione della situazione potrebbe spingere le minoranze Albanesi in Macedonia ed in Serbia a continuare e chidere piu autonomia e che gli estremisti potrebbero cercare di sfruttare l'insodisfazione della gente e la violenza per cercare di unificarsi con il Kosovo. Sempre secondo la Voice Of America, il direttore dei servizi di informazione militari, il generale Michael Maples, ha espresso al Senato americano la sua preocupazione per la situazione nel nord della citta di Mitroviza in Kosovo, che potrebbe precipitare in violenze aggiungendo che comunque fino ad ora le truppe NATO hanno impedito tale precipitazione.

A proposito delle reazioni nei Balcani e delle conseguenze dell'indipendenza del Kosovo mi sembra interessante vedere le notizie che arrivano dalla Grecia un paese balcanico che fa parte dell’Unione Europea e quindi ha un ruolo molto importante in relazione alla vicenda kosovara.

Intanto dobbiamo notare che la Grecia non ha ancora riconosciuto formalmente l'indipendenza del Kosovo. Nei giorni scorsi ad Atene si è svolta una manifestazione di circa un centinaio di persone per protestare contro la dichiarazione d'indipendenza del Kosovo e contro le presunte ''ingerenze'' di Paesi stranieri nei Balcani che l'avrebbero favorita. Un movimento indipendentista greco ha anche chiesto alle autorità internazionali di dare alla minoranza greca in Albania lo stesso diritto di autodeterminazione che è stato attribuito agli albanesi del Kosovo. Questo piccolo movimento ha poi avvertito il governo di Karamanlis che, qualora la Grecia riconoscesse l`indipendenza del Kosovo prima che il cosidetto Epiro del Nord ottenga l`autonomia, allora tutta la Grecia sarebbe coinvolta in dure proteste che si diffonderebbero ovunque. Nel comizio che si è tenuto davanti alla sede del Parlamento greco, il rappresentante dell'Associazione Panepirica ha dichiarato che “il Kosovo e l`Epiro del Nord sono casi molto simili tra di loro, e per tale motivo due questioni identiche non possono avere due soluzioni diverse!

Secondo te sono minacce da prendere sul serio?

Secondo me no. Questi movimenti non hanno nessuna possibilita di organizzare proteste del genere. Ma, per infomare meglio i nostri ascoltatori, dobbiamo ricordare che circa un anno fa, il sindaco della cittadinaza di Himara in Albania, Vasil Bollano, a nome dell'associazione OMONIA che rappresenta la comunità greca in Albania, divenne il primo ed unico rappresentante locale in Albania a chiedere una certa autonomia dell'Epiro del Nord - o meglio, del Vorio-Epirio - cioè il territorio situato nel Sud dell'Albania. Da allora, la posizione politica di Vasil Bollano ha subito un'evidente riduzione poiche e’ stato criticato anche dagli esponenti dell’Unione per i Diritti Umani che rappresenta a livello politico e parlamentare la minoranza greca dell’Albania. In un'intervista televisiva di quel periodo, Bollano aveva affermato che “la richiesta dell' associazione OMONIA sull'autonomia dell'Epiro del Nord non è diversa da ciٍ che vogliono gli albanesi per il Kosovo”. La dichiarazione provocٍ una serie di dibatitti televisivi in cui venne sottolneato anche da parte degli esponenti della stessa minoranza greca, il basso livello culturale del sindaco Bollano. E ora nessuno esponente della minoranza Greca in Albania ha appoggiato le richieste avanzate dagli estremisti greci nelle piazze di Atene. Anche il sindaco Bollano non si e’ pronunciato per niente. Anzi c'è stata un'altra notizia che ha suscitato un altro dibatitto forte negli ambienti estremisti della politica Greca. Un gruppo di storici Greci hanno pubblicato uno studio in cui hanno confermato quello che la minoranza dei Chiami aveva denunciato da anni sulla loro sorte dopo la fine della Seconda Guerra Mondiale.

Ricordiamo che in altre occasioni abbiamo parlato della popolazione dei Ciami e della difficile situazione che vive, una situazione di cui si sono occupati varie volte anche i deputati radicali al parlamento europeo... Suggerisco leggere dall'archivio

Esatto. Gli studiosi dell'iniversità di Atene hanno dichiarato che “I Chiami (اamët) che vivevano nell’Epiro Greco e furono massacrati ed espulsi con violenza dalle forze militari greche tra il 1944 ed il 1945”. Fino ad oggi contro questa verità denunciata da molti anni dagli stessi Chiami, si sono pronunciati solo esponenti delle forze estremiste greche; comunisti e neofascisti. Da parte delle autorita greche i Chiami sono stati considerati come collaborazionisti degli occupanti Italiani e Tedeschi durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale e come tali sono andati insieme agli invasori Tedeschi dopo aver perso la guerra! Ora i professori Bulciotis e Ciceliqis smentiscono le posizioni ufficiale greche al riguardo del caso dei Chiami mettendo il Governo greco in una posizione difficile.

C'è stata qualche reazione ufficiale ad Atene?

Per ora non risultano dichiarazioni pubbliche individuali o istituzionali da parte delle autorita greche. Quest ha dato spazio agli esponenti delle forze estremiste che non hanno esitato a considerare questo documento scentifico parte dei progetti di Panalbanismo a favore del progetto di realizzare la cosiddetta "Grande Albania".

E da parte dei Chiami come è stato commentato questo documento?

I rappresentati della popolazione Chiama hanno gia dichiarato francamente di non volere altro che il rispetto dei Diritti Umani e che il progetto della Grande Albania esiste solo nelle menti malate degli estremisti Greci e Serbi. Tahir Muhedini presidente del Partito per l'Integrazione e la Giustizia, un organismo politico che rappresenta gli interessi della popolazione dei Chiami, ha scritto sul giornale Albanese “Shqip” un articolo in cui ha dichiarato che i Chiami vogliono solo tornare ed ottenere la cittadinanza greca che fu loro tolta dopo l'espulsione violenta dalle loro case e dai loro territori. Muhedini ha ricordato la convivenza pacifica con i Greci sia prima della seconda guerra mondiale, sia dopo la guerra e anche durante la recente democrazia con la minoranza Greca in Albania, e ha ribadito di non volere altro che il godimento degli stessi diritti fondamentali. Il diritto della doppia cittadinanza Greca – Albanese, il diritto alle proprieta sia in Grecia per i Chiami che in Albania per i greci, ed il dirritto all'uso della lingua madre per entrambi i gruppi sia in Grecia sia in Albania.

Certo, perché esiste anche una minoranza greca in Albania. Com'è la loro situazione?

Per quanto riguarda la situazione della minoranza Greca in Albania dobbiamo affermare che secondo loro non tutto va alla perfezione, ma d’altra parte con la fine della dittatura comunista e l'arrivo del pluralismo politico in Albania loro hanno sempre fatto parte delle coalizioni governative sia della sinistra sia della destra come anche oggi. Per finire, visto che parliamo di Grecia. Mi sembra che ci siano delle novità riguardo alla questione del nome della Macedonia.

Ricordiamo che la Macedonia attualmente viene indicata ufficialmente come FYROM perché la Grecia si oppone all'uso della deominazione "Macedonia" perché teme che questo possa nascondere l'intenzione di annettere la sua regione che si chiama in questo modo...

Sى, infatti... La Grecia aveva preanunciato l'intenzione di usare il suo diritto veto contro l’adesione della Macedonia alla NATO tramite il programa ‘Adriatico 3’ che include anche Albania e Croazia che dovrebbero essere invitate ufficialmente alla prossima riunione dell'Alleanza Atlantica che si terrà ad aprile. Dopo gli interventi da parte di Washington e di Bruxelles, e anche dell'ONU che ha spedito un suo inviato speciale al riguardo di questo caso, stando alle notizie degli ultimi giorni sembra che Atene abbia cambiato la propria posizione e anche Skopje sta dando segni di tolleranza. Molto presto quindi potremmo avere una soluzione accettabile per entrambe le parti.
 

orakulli

Anëtar i Respektuar
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

Gli studiosi dell'iniversità di Atene hanno dichiarato che “I Chiami (اamët) che vivevano nell’Epiro Greco e furono massacrati ed espulsi con violenza dalle forze militari greche tra il 1944 ed il 1945”. Fino ad oggi contro questa verità denunciata da molti anni dagli stessi Chiami, si sono pronunciati solo esponenti delle forze estremiste greche; comunisti e neofascisti. Da parte delle autorita greche i Chiami sono stati considerati come collaborazionisti degli occupanti Italiani e Tedeschi durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale e come tali sono andati insieme agli invasori Tedeschi dopo aver perso la guerra! Ora i professori Bulciotis e Ciceliqis smentiscono le posizioni ufficiale greche al riguardo del caso dei Chiami mettendo il Governo greco in una posizione difficile.
 

Зngjεll

___________
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

La loi française n'exige pas qu'un étranger devenu français renonce à sa nationalité d'origine ou qu'un Français ayant acquis une nationalité étrangère renonce à la nationalité française ceci sous réserve des traités internationaux et notamment, dans le cadre du Conseil de l'Europe, des Conventions du 6 mai 1963 sur la réduction des cas de pluralité de nationalités et du 6 novembre 1997 sur la nationalité.

Ligji francez nuk kerkon ( me kulm) qe nje i huaj i bere francez te heq dore ( te mohoj ) shtetesine ( kombesine )e tij te origjines , ose qe nje francez qe ka marre nje shtetesi te huaj te heqi dore nga shtetesia franceze , kjo rezervuar ne marrveshjet (traktatet) internacionale dhe veçanerisht , ne kuader te Keshillit Europian , te Marreveshjeve te 6 maj 1963 mbi uljen e rasteve te shumicave te shtetesive dhe te 6 nentor 1997 mbi shtetesine .


la Convention européenne sur la nationalité du 6 novembre 1997, entrée en vigueur le 1er mars 2000, prend acte de cette variété des situations en matière de pluralité de nationalités comme l'atteste la rédaction de son article 16 sur la conservation de la nationalité précédente : "Un Etat partie ne doit pas faire de la renonciation ou de la perte d'une autre nationalité une condition pour l'acquisition ou le maintien de sa nationalité lorsque cette renonciation ou cette perte n'est pas possible ou ne peut être raisonnablement exigée".


Marreveshja Europiane mbi shtetesine e 6 nentor 1997 , e futur ne fuqi ne 1 mars 2000 , merr njoftim te ketij lloji situate ne ne çeshtjen e shumices se shtetesive , si e verteton redaktimi i artikullit te saj : artikull 16 mbi marreveshjet e shtetesive precedente( qe vijojne me pare) :
" Nje Shtet qe ben pjese nuk duhet te heqi dore ose humbjen e nje shtetesie tjeter , nje kusht per te marre ose poseduar shtetesine e tij , kur ky mohim ( heqje dore) ose kjo humbje nuk eshte e mundur , mund ta kerkojme me ngul ( me llogjike ).



La double nationalité peut s'acquérir par la naturalisation, par la déclaration (mariage, mineur), par cession d'un territoire ou accès à l'indépendance d'un Etat (cas de l'Algérie en 1962).

Dulel shtetesia mund te merret nga natyralizimi , nga deklarata ( martese, minore ) , nga lenia ( ose transferim te drejtash) e nje territori , ose hyrja ne pavaresi i nje Shteti ( si rasti i Algjerise ne 1962
 
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

Orakull pika mua per nacionalizmin tend...Me shan ata qe marrin nenshtetesi greke dhe kur vjen puna te perton b.... te perkthesh materialin e sjellur.
S'ke fytyre te flasesh me ne kete teme.
 

Зngjεll

___________
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

Ndoshta ky artikull do ju duket interesant dhe i mire per te ditur :)

Vendet Dy-shtetesia Thirrje Denimi
(dubel shtetesia) per ushtri me vdekje

AD l'Andorre Jo Jo Jo
AE les ةmirats arabes unis Jo Jo Po
AF l'Afghanistan Jo/Po Po (Jo) Po
AG Antigua-et-Barbuda Po Jo Po
AL l'Albanie Po Po (Jo) Jo/Po
AM l'Arménie Non Po (Po) Jo
AO l'Angola Non Po Po (Po) Jo
AR l'Argentine Jo/Po Jo/Po Jo/Po
AT l'Autriche Jo/Po Po (Po) Jo
AU l'Australie Po Jo Jo
AZ l'Azerbaïdjan Jo Po (Jo) Jo
BA la Bosnie-Herzégovine Jo/Po Po(Po) Jo
BB la Barbade Po Jo Po
BD le Bangladesh Po Jo Po
BE la Belgique Jo Jo Jo
BF le Burkina Faso Po Jo Po/Jo
BG la Bulgarie Po Po (Po) Jo
BH Bahreïn Jo Jo Po
BI le Burundi Jo Jo Po
BJ le Bénin Po Me te zgjedhur Po/Jo
BN le Brunéi Darussalam Jo Jo Po/Jo
BO la Bolivie Jo/Po Po (Jo) Jo/Po
BR le Brésil Po Po (Po) Jo/Oui
BS les Bahamas Jo Jo Po
BT le Bhoutan Jo Me te zgjedhur Jo
BW le Botswana Jo Jo Po
BY le Bélarus Po Po (Po) Po
BZ le Belize Po/Jo Jo Po
CA le Canada Po Jo Jo
CF la République centrafricain Po Me te zgjedhur Po/ Jo
CG le Congo ; la République du Congo Jo Jo Po/Jo
CH la Suisse Po Po (Po) Jo
CI la Côte d'Ivoire Po Me te zgjedhur Jo
CL le Chili Jo/Po Po ( Jo) Jo/Po
CM le Cameroun Jo Jo Po
CN la République de Chine Jo Me te zgjedhur Po
CO la Colombie Po Po( Jo) Jo
CR le Costa Rica Po Jo Jo
CS la Serbie-et-Monténégro Po Po (Po) Jo
CU Cuba Jo Po (Jo) Po
CV le Cap-Vert Po Po (Po) Jo
CY Chypre Po Po (Po) Jo
CZ la République tchèque Jo/Po Po (Oui) Jo
DE l'Allemagne Jo/Po Po (Po) Jo
DJ Djibouti Jo Jo Jo
DK le Danemark Jo Po (Po) Jo
DM la Dominique Po Jo Po
DO la République dominicaine Jo/Po Po (Jo) Jo
DZ l'Algérie Non Po(Jo) Po/Jo Po/Jo
EC l'ةquateur Jo/Po Po/Jo Jo
EG l'ةgypte Po/Jo Po (Jo) Po
ER l'ةrythrée Po Po (Jo) Po
ES l'Espagne Jo/Po Jo Jo
ET l'ةthiopie Jo Jo Po
FI la Finlande Po Po (Po) Jo
FJ les Fidji Jo/Po Jo Jo/Po
FM les ةtats fédérés de Micronésie Jo Jo Jo
FR la France Po Jo Jo
GA le Gabon Jo Jo Po
GB le Royaume-Uni Po Jo Jo
GD la Grenade Po Jo Po/Jo
GE la Géorgie ? Po (Jo) Jo
GH le Ghana Po/Jo Jo Po
GM la Gambie Jo Jo Po/Jo
GN la Guinée Jo Po(Jo) Po
GR la Grèce Jo Po(Po) Jo
GT le Guatemala Jo/Po Jo/Po Po
GW la Guinée-Bissau Jo Po (Jo) Jo
GY la Guyana Jo Jo Po
HN le Honduras Po/Jo Jo/Po Jo
HR la Croatie Po/Jo Po Jo
HT Haïti Jo/Po Jo Jo
HU la Hongrie Po Jo Jo
ID l'Indonésie Jo Me te zgjedhur Po
IE l'Irlande Po Jo Jo
IL Israël Po/Jo Po (Jo) Jo/Po
IN l'Inde Jo Jo Po
IQ l'Iraq Jo Po (Jo) Po
IR la République islamique d'Iran Jo/Po Po (Jo) Po
IS l'Islande Jo/Po Jo Jo
IT l'Italie Po Po Jo
JM la Jamaïque Po Jo Po
JO la Jordanie Po Jo/Po Po
 

abstraction

Carpe Diem
Vendndodhja
Diku .
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

Nuk duhet gjykuar njeri por nga ky kendveshtrimi im mendoj se une personalisht nuk do e beja nja gje te tille. Sepse fundja njeriu c'eshte sot ? Asgje . Ai dinjetet e mban gjalle dhe kokelarte. Nese ti detyrohesh te nderrosh me kombesi dhe emer, perse jeton ne ate vend ? Per nje cope buke ? Kurrsesi nuk do e beja . Me mire jetoj ne vendin tim, buke e kripe dhe koken lart.

e theksoj nuk dua te gjykoja ato qe e kane bere nje gje te tille. Por ja qe njeriu ka pak seder dhe ego. Ku shkuan ato valle ?
 

abstraction

Carpe Diem
Vendndodhja
Diku .
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

Meqe tema eshte ne lidhje te nenshtetesise , marrjen e saj .. eshte dicka ndryshe me kombesine qe kishin cekur ca me lart. Se mos na hidhen europianet qe kane pass ketu :D
 

Зngjεll

___________
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

Ja ku e ke me te qarte Biancka - Kjo eshte lista e shteteve nese japin apo jo dubel shtetesi , ne vendet ku eshte Po/Jo eshte dhe PO dhe Jo sepse varet nga kushtet e atij vendi .
Per ata qe kuptojne fr mund ta shikojne origjinalin tek kjo adrese :
La double nationalitأ©, la conscription et la peine de mort


Dy-shtetesia--Dubel shtetesi

AD l'Andorre------- Jo

AE les ةmirats arabes unis---- Jo

AF l'Afghanistan ---- Po/Jo

AL l'Albanie ------- Po

AM l'Arménie------- Jo

AO l'Angola ------- Jo

AR l'Argentine----- Po/Jo

AT l'Autriche------ Po/Jo

AU l'Australie------ Po

AZ l'Azerbaïdjan------ Jo

BA la Bosnie-Herzégovine----- Po/Jo

BD le Bangladesh------- Po

BE la Belgique------ Jo

BG la Bulgarie------- Po

BJ le Bénin ------- Po

BO la Bolivie------- Po/Jo

BR le Brésil ---------- Po

BS les Bahamas------- Jo

BW le Botswana--------- Jo

BY le Bélarusi ------ Po

CA le Canada------ Po

CG le Congo ; la République du Congo----- Jo

CH la Suisse --------- Po
CL le Chili --------- Po/Jo

CM le Cameroun ------ Jo

CN la République populaire de Chine -- Jo

CO la Colombie ----- Po

CR le Costa Rica ------ Po

CS la Serbie-et-Monténégro----- Po

CU Cuba ------ Jo

CY Chypre------- Po

CZ la République tchèque------ Po/Jo

DE l'Allemagne----- Po/Jo

DK le Danemark----- Jo

DZ l'Algérie ------ Jo

EC l'ةquateur------ Po/Jo

EE l'Estonie ------- Jo

EG l'ةgypte------- Po/Jo

ES l'Espagne------ Po/Jo

FI la Finlande----- Po

FR la France------ Po

GB le Royaume-Uni----- Po

GE la Géorgie----- ?

GR la Grèce------------ Po

HR la Croatie----- Po/Jo

HU la Hongrie----- Po

ID l'Indonésie---------- Jo

IE l'Irlande--------- Po

IL Israël---- Po/Jo

IN l'Inde----- Jo

IQ l'Iraq---- Jo

IR la République islamique d'Iran----- Po/Jo

IS l'Islande------------- Po/Jo

IT l'Italie ---- Po

JM la Jamaïque--- Po

JO la Jordanie---- Po

JP le Japon ------------Jo

KE le Kenya ---- Jo

KG le Kirghizistan ---- Jo

KH le Cambodge--- Po/Jo

KP l République populaire démocratique de Corée--- Po/Jo

KR Corée---- Jo

KW Koweït --- Jo

KZ Kazakhstan ---- Jo

LB Liban ---- Po

LT Lituanie---- Po/Jo

LU Luxembourg ----Po/Jo

LV Lettonie ---- Po/Jo

MA Maroc----- Po/Jo

MD Moldova ---- Po/Jo

MK Macédoine--- Po

MT Malte --- Po

MX Mexique --- Po/Jo

NE Niger ---- Jo

NG Nigéria------ Po/Jo

NI Nicaragua---- Po/Jo

NL Pays-Bas--- Po/Jo

NO Norvège---- Po/Jo

NZ Nouvelle-Zélande ---- Po

PA Panama----- Po/Jo

PE Pérou ----- Po

PH Philippines--- Po

PK Pakistan---- Po

PL Pologne----- Po

PS Palestine ---- ?

PT Portugal---- Po

PY Paraguay-- --- Po/Jo

RO Roumanie --- Po

RU Russie---- Po

SA l'Arabie Saoudite--- Jo

SD Soudan --- Jo

SE Suède---- Po

SI Slovénie --- Po/Jo

SK Slovaquie---- Po

SN Sénégal---- Po

SO Somalie----- ?

SY Siri ---- Po

TN Tunisie ---- Po

TR Turquie----- Po

UA l'Ukraine ---- Jo

US ةtats-Unis --- Po

VE Venezuela-------- Jo

YE Yémen---- Jo

ZA l'Afrique du Sud ---- Po/Jo

1
 

orakulli

Anëtar i Respektuar
Titulli: Skandaloze:Greqia, nënshtetësi masive emigrantëve të krishterë shqiptarë.

Al calduccio nel cuore della mia famiglia....
Pjesa ne italisht ishte per ty.Meqe ke dicka te shkruajt ne Italisht,mendova se duhet te dije italisht.Paskam gabuar.
Para se te japesh mendim per nje teme si kjo,duhet te besh ca kerkime ne internet(ka site plot0.Te gjesh material rethh temes dhe ti lexosh me vemendje per te kuptua si eshte koncptimi i tyre filozofik,ligjor ne kohet e sotme.Si jane ligjet e vendeve te vecanta,cilat jane detyrimet ligjore qe brojne nga konventat nderkombetare ku ka marre pjese shtete e Europes dhe kane firmosur per ti zbatuar keto te drejta.Pasi ti lexosh,mesosh,kuptosh mund te shkruash idete e tua ne kete drejtim.
Ke te nenvziuar kombesine,ne gjuhen italiane, ne pjesen qe i takon pashaportes.Por te diskutosh per kete teme,nuk mund ta permbledhesh me dy reshta.Jane konventat nderkombetare qe kane percaktuar qarte te drejten e gjuhes,kombesise,shtetesise.
Ne gjuhen angleze fjala Convention ka dy kuptime;1.bindje2.mbledhje.
Mbledhje ndermjet njerzeve,perfaqesuesve te organizatave,shteteve te cilet kane bindje te njejte per ;te drejtat e njeriut per shembull.Di ti Bianka,cilat jane te drejtat themelore te njeriut???
por problemi me ty qendron;
Di ti bianka cdo te thote "mendje e hapur" dhe"mendje e mbyllur".Nje mendje e hapur,e zgjeruar nga procesi i te mesuarit nuk tenton te ngushtohet,te behet mendje e e mbyllyr,per shembull.Nje mendje e mbyllur,e ngushte,e vogel ka ngelur e tille sepse ri gjithmone mbyllur ndaj hyrjes se dijes.
Cdo njeri ne kete bote eshte gjithmone nen nj proces te panderpre te mesuari,ku meson nga te tjeret dhe mesohet prej te tjereve.Kjo quhet ndryshe dhe "inteligjenca kollektive".Nje nga qellimet kryesore te forumuve eshte pikerisht mesim-nxenia e gjithesejcilit nga "inteligjenca kolektive" si nje forme e perparuar edukimi.Por e gjitha kjo kerkon "mendje te hapur" dhe jo "mendje mbyllur'.Perndryshe harxhon kohen tende ne radhe te pare,te tjereve si kjo e imja per ty tani,si dhe i shton mundesine vetes qe te mos adoptohesh me tej ne jete me elementet kryesore jetesore.

Shtetesia mund te jepet,ndersa kombesia jo.Shteti grek po shfrytezon keqesine ekonomike te shqiptareve per ti ndryshue kombesine,bianka,dhe jo shtetesine.Kjo eshte e verteta ,Bianka,do ti,apo nuk do ti.E verteta ,Bianka,eshte e rendesihsme ne jete.Mundesia per ta kuptuar ate varet se sa "mendje hapur' je.
 
Top